Note : Onn Mahmud is the brother of Taib Mahmud, the Chief Minister of Sarawak. The question being raised is the origin, accumulation and concentration of wealth into one family's hands. Further questions raised are the propriety and methodology of this wealth creation. How did it happen? As the Chief Minister and Land & Resource Minister, wealth can be transferred in various ways into one's own coffers.
As can be seen in this chart, Onn Mahmud holds large stakes in the Achi Jaya Group of Companies.
Just looking at Achi Jaya Holdings and Achi Jaya Plantations accounts as at 31.12.08 you can see the phenomeonal amount of wealth being generated.
Achi Jaya Plantations
Achi Jaya Plantations had assets of (Non-Current Assets (631m) + Current Assets (29m) ) 661m. It's Net Assets (Assets - Liabilities) was 289m.
The Revenue was 194m and the Profit was 55.6m. The Net Profit Margin was 28.68% (Out of the revenue of 194m, 28.68% was profit after cost, pretty good, these kind of margin in the business world is salivating).
Share Capital :- Onn Mahmud personally invested RM 9.5m. Achi Jaya Holdings invested another 15.4m
Achi Jaya Holdings
Achi Jaya Holdings had assets of (Non-Current Assets (745m) + Current Assets (83.8m) ) 829m. It's Net Assets (Assets - Liabilities) was 386.8m.
The Revenue was 277.6m and the Profit was 37.6m. The Net Profit Margin was 13.53% .
Share Capital :- Onn Mahmud personally invested RM21m as effectively the 100% shareholder. Note on a 21m investment, the net assets were 386.8m. 18 times the initial investment. That is amazing wealth creation. the profit itself (for 2008 only!) was 37.6m, 1.8 times the initial investment and this is only for one year.
Onn Mahmud Share Capital
Achi Jaya Holdings - 21m
Achi Jaya Properties - 6m
Achi Jaya Plantations - 9.5m
So Onn Mahmud has invested in his name 36.5m (that's 36,500,000) into these companies. Where is this money from?
Net Worth
Based on Onn Mahmud's 100% holding in Achi Jaya Holdings, 15.19% holding in Achi Jaya Properties and 5.43% of Achi Jaya Plantations and the Net Assets of these companies, Onn Mahmud (Just based on his interest in these companies only) is worth (386.8m + (15.19% of 35.3m) + (5.43% of 289m) ) approximately a staggering 407.85m RM (407,850,000).
Herolite Investment Ltd and Grand Shine Trading Ltd
I can't find the ownership details on these companies. If someone more well versed in getting info from the Hong Kong company registrar can guide me I would be grateful.
These companies have collectively invested RM24.6m in Achi Jaya Properties and RM150m in Achi Jaya Plantations. Who are they? And why are they investing in parallel to Onn Mahmud as seen in the share capital section above?
Update : I have traced the ownership of Herolite and Grand Shine Trading through various HK$20.00 companies. The Ultimate parent is one Francisco C Sebastian and Integrated Financial Holdings in the British Virgin Islands. The British Virgin Islands offshore companies do not reveal ownership details to the public.
These are companies capitalised at HK$10,000 (Herolite and Grand Shine Trading are capitalised at HK$10,000) yet investing RM175m in Achi Jaya Plantations and Achi Jaya Properties.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Taib's Shipping Monopoly - Financial Summary
As can be seen here, the shipping monopoly via Achi Jaya Transportation insisted by Taib Mahmud has produced revenues of 59.4m in 2008 and a profit of 3.9m. Unless we know the breakdown of the cost the true P&L/rent attributable to Taib will be unknown.
Money can be siphoned off from Achi Jaya Transportation via consulting fees, high salaries, high rentals paid to associated companies, management fees etc. So the P&L of 3.9m does not really show how much is actually earned by the individuals involved. Current assets of 21m generally indicate near cash or cash items.So very liquid, likely fees from being the sole shipping agent.
Also note the low capital invested. 0.5m, while the turonover is 59.4m and the audited profit is 3.9m, almost 8 times the capital invested (for 2008 only!) (and cash of 21m on the balance sheet). I wish I could invest in this business and get these kind of returns.
Money can be siphoned off from Achi Jaya Transportation via consulting fees, high salaries, high rentals paid to associated companies, management fees etc. So the P&L of 3.9m does not really show how much is actually earned by the individuals involved. Current assets of 21m generally indicate near cash or cash items.So very liquid, likely fees from being the sole shipping agent.
Also note the low capital invested. 0.5m, while the turonover is 59.4m and the audited profit is 3.9m, almost 8 times the capital invested (for 2008 only!) (and cash of 21m on the balance sheet). I wish I could invest in this business and get these kind of returns.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Taib's shipping monopoly
Below are some excerpts from various sources on Taib's monopoly over timber exports from Sarawak
"
Table 4.9 Taib family ownership of Archipelago Shipping
Source: documents obtained during 28 October 1996 interview with Institut Pekerjaan Komuniti"
In Malaysia, Sarawak Has a Cash Register on the Port
"
Turning to another important Taib family business, the shipping of all timber exports in Sarawak goes through Archipelago Shipping (Dauvergne 1997: 109), a company almost entirely owned by the Chief Minister’s family.[1] Because shipping a cubic meter of timber to foreign markets costs about $40, and because Sarawak exported an average of ten million cubic meters of timber each year during the 1980s, the company’s cash flow was four billion dollars during the 1980s.[2] Hence, in addition to timber industry holdings, the chief minister and his family are enriched by this shipping monopoly. As Table 4.9 shows, the entire management and 92 percent of the shares in Archipelago Shipping are held by relatives of the chief minister or companies owned by them.
Table 4.9 Taib family ownership of Archipelago Shipping
Name of board member or shareholder | Position in or percentage of shares held in company | Relationship to Taib Mahmud, Chief Minister of |
Onn Bin Mahmud | Director | Chief minister’s brother |
Achi Corporation | 52 percent shareholder | Company 100 percent owned and controlled by Onn Bin Mahmud, the chief minister’s brother |
Fredahanam Bte Mahmud | Director | Chief minister’s sister |
Serira | 15 percent shareholder | Company 100 owned percent owned by the three sons of the chief minister’s sister, Fredahanam Bte Mahmud. |
Mohd. Arip Bin Mahmud | Director and 10 percent shareholder | Chief minister’s brother |
Haji Mohd. Tufail Bin Mahmud | Director and 10 percent shareholder | Chief minister’s brother |
Grand Shine Trading | 8 percent shareholder | No obvious connection to the chief minister |
Masba Holdings | 5 percent shareholder | Company 100 percent owned by Abdul Aziz Haji Hussain, who is married to the sister of the chief minister, Fredahanam Bte Mahmud. |
In Malaysia, Sarawak Has a Cash Register on the Port
| http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?Itemid=178&id=871&option=com_content&task=view |
| Written by Tony Chan | ||
| Wednesday, 14 November 2007 | ||
Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud’s family continues to want its “commission” on timber shipped to Japan For weeks, as many as a dozen Japanese-registered log carriers have been riding at anchor outside four Sarawak ports in Malaysia after being refused entry to pick up timber for the Japanese market. Several have left empty-handed while the owners negotiate with a company called Achi Jaya Shipping of Sarawak. The decision to shut out the Japanese vessels is because Achi Jaya is demanding payment of “commissions” of US$2-3 per square meter of timber. The shippers are refusing to pay because Japanese tax authorities earlier ruled that the payments were kickbacks to the family of Sarawak Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud. Despite the publicity in Japan, Taib Mahmud is hanging tough. Sources say he is continuing to demand payment. When Japanese log carriers turned up at Sarawak ports, in October, they were told they would not be granted permission by Achi Jaya Shipping to pick up timber unless they continued to pay the kickbacks. With strong ties to the governing Barisan Nasional in Kuala Lumpur and the ability to make local journalists toe the line, Taib has denied allegations of illegality and forced two of Malaysia’s government-linked newspapers to apologize for airing reports on the mess. Malaysiakini, the independent Internet-based publication, has also been threatened with a lawsuit but has refused to retract its story. When contacted by Asia Sentinel, a spokesman for Achi Jaya Shipping declined to comment. The picture painted by Japanese tax authorities is fairly daunting. According to reports in Japan Times and Yomiuri Shimbun, the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau determined that the payments were rebates, not legitimate expenses, and it is likely to impose well over 400 million yen in back taxes and penalties against the shipping companies. It is mandatory for all log carriers calling at Sarawak ports to register with the chief minister's family-linked company, Dewan Niaga Sarawak, as the sole agent for timber shipments out of the state and to appoint Achi Jaya as their ship-handling agent. The payments – at least RM32 million (US$9.67 million) - previously were alleged to have been routed through a Hong Kong-based company called Regent Star, according to Japanese tax authorities. Some 90 percent of Regent Star allegedly was owned by Taib Mahmud’s brother Onn until the company was abruptly wound up in June after it became public that the tax authorities had gone after the ship-owners. The tax authorities reportedly have ordered the Kansai Line to pay 50 million yen in back taxes and penalties for falsely reporting so-called intermediation fees totalling 130 million yen to Regent Star over a seven year period ending in December 2005, in its cost of loading logs in ports in Sarawak, in an effort to hide the payments. So long as their owners refuse to pay the commissions, permission to pick up Sarawak logs and other timber products will be withheld, a shipping company executive told Asia Sentinel. Several large exporters have started making enquiries with other Malaysian-registered shipping lines in Sarawak but they too would have to go through Achi Jaya Shipping Agency as sub-agents. The Japanese shipping cartel has made the payments since the early 1980s, reportedly on the order of the provincial government. Although the Japanese tax authorities’ limit on the time period investigated kept the amount to RM32 million, payments made over the last 20 years are said to amount to hundreds of millions of ringgit. Sarawak's log and timber exports since 1970 have been valued at more than US$25 billion, based on figures available at the Trade Statistics Department in Sarawak. In the Taib Mahmud empire’s defense, the companies said these were legitimate expenses as they were commissions paid to Regent Star in Hong Kong on the directive of the Sarawak provincial government. A timber industry source said the decision to shut out the Japanese-registered vessels is a blow for exports, especially those with long-term ties to large Japanese buying houses, particularly for plywood. So long as their owners refuse to pay, permission to pick up Sarawak logs and other timber products will be withheld, according to a shipping company executive. Several large exporters have started making enquiries with other Malaysian-registered shipping lines in Sarawak but they, too, presumably will have to go through Achi Jaya Shipping Agency as sub agents.
| ||
Timber concessionaires
I will post online public documents relating to the dissertation "
"The Unofficial Appropriation of Rain Forest Rent by Rulers In Insular Southeast Asia Between 1970 and 1999"
that I have been highlighting in my blog. I will focus on those concessionaires that Taib's family has a direct interest in. This will not include those where they are directors but not shareholders. There are questions of propriety when for example the sister of the Chief Minister who is also Minister of Resources (Menteri Perancangan dan Pengurusan Sumber) and the Minister of Finance sits on the board of a timber concessionary. This is a clear conflict of interest given that the Chief Minister allocates these concessions. However direct shareholdings and the economic benefit derived are clearer indications of impropriety.
I will then move away from information in the dissertation to other rent-seeking activity in Sarawak and yes, there is a lot.
UPDATE : Having looked through some documents from the registrar of companies, I can see that the directors have been changed since the dissertation, so have the shareholders and some of the companies have been dissolved (perhaps those concessions have run their course). The dissertation is from 2001. Unless someone does the whole exercise again, it will be hard to identify specific timber concession companies.
So I will move on to the shipping monopoply highlighted in the dissertation and elsewhere and then to all the other reports on Taib's very public wealth.
"The Unofficial Appropriation of Rain Forest Rent by Rulers In Insular Southeast Asia Between 1970 and 1999"
that I have been highlighting in my blog. I will focus on those concessionaires that Taib's family has a direct interest in. This will not include those where they are directors but not shareholders. There are questions of propriety when for example the sister of the Chief Minister who is also Minister of Resources (Menteri Perancangan dan Pengurusan Sumber) and the Minister of Finance sits on the board of a timber concessionary. This is a clear conflict of interest given that the Chief Minister allocates these concessions. However direct shareholdings and the economic benefit derived are clearer indications of impropriety.
I will then move away from information in the dissertation to other rent-seeking activity in Sarawak and yes, there is a lot.
UPDATE : Having looked through some documents from the registrar of companies, I can see that the directors have been changed since the dissertation, so have the shareholders and some of the companies have been dissolved (perhaps those concessions have run their course). The dissertation is from 2001. Unless someone does the whole exercise again, it will be hard to identify specific timber concession companies.
So I will move on to the shipping monopoply highlighted in the dissertation and elsewhere and then to all the other reports on Taib's very public wealth.
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Chapter 7 Conclusion
In Indonesia, Sarawak and Sabah, personal ties by political elites to the timber industry were high and the ability of governments to officially capture timber rent was low. The result of these states' inability to capture timber rent is an enormous loss in official revenue. Table 7.1 below shows the revenues lost in Indonesia, Sarawak and Sabah as a result of concessionaires being asked by the government to pay timber revenues at below-optimal levels. The same figures are also a measurement of the amount of timber rent earned by timber concessionaires and/or unofficially appropriated from them by heads of states and their proxies or clients. The total figure for timber revenues that could have been collected, but were not collected, by all three states over the period of 30 years is more than $40 billion.
Table 7.1 Timber revenues (in dollars) lost in Indonesia, Sarawak and Sabah from 1970-1999
Year | Indonesia | Sarawak | Sabah |
1970 | Incomplete data | No data | Incomplete data |
1971 | Incomplete data | 2,401,592 | 381,335,065 |
1972 | Incomplete data | 1,033,303 | 366,427,248 |
1973 | Incomplete data | 25,681,232 | 404,458,457 |
1974 | -10,480,715 | 26,330,765 | 334,632,914 |
1975 | -97,215,714 | 10,328,746 | 253,635,117 |
1976 | -132,560,353 | 62,502,857 | 587,342,233 |
1977 | 62,966,781 | 63,667,843 | 576,518,136 |
1978 | 296,459,594 | 82,727,918 | 687,980,386 |
1979 | 171,940,408 | 310,682,736 | 100,408,2700 |
1980 | 1,062,454,516 | 289,029,845 | 749,863,277 |
1981 | 1,067,607,041 | 246,348,032 | 731,203,306 |
1982 | 380,903,703 | 379,826,481 | 445,179,563 |
1983 | 190,984,540 | 307,356,894 | 377,397,627 |
1984 | 173,277,600 | 368,643,107 | 447,364,854 |
1985 | 143,683,300 | 344,832,692 | 316,233,468 |
1986 | 33,675,696 | 215,022,320 | 403,320,707 |
1987 | 107486676 | 1,031,753,016 | 533,185,778 |
1988 | 364,501,404 | 786,749,653 | 303,704,306 |
1989 | 550,354,473 | 939,383,352 | 224,719,003 |
1990 | 562,931,244 | 1,085,288,284 | 67,939,295 |
1991 | 710,044,569 | 1,476,200,318 | 77,587,208 |
1992 | 636,839,176 | 1,595,902,618 | 108,913,363 |
1993 | 717,041,231 | 1,473,218,702 | 12,328,814 |
1994 | 1,526,340,259 | 1,202,321,597 | 0 |
1995 | 1,136,963,700 | 1,152,647,052 | 0 |
1996 | 2,063,806,110 | 1,087,124,457 | 0 |
1997 | 1,398,731,712 | 808,219,598 | 28,052,812 |
1998 | 1,120,832,966 | 421,304,552 | 19,524,946 |
1999 | 545,357,528 | 455,542,561 | 69,351,583 |
Total | 14,784,927,444 | 16,252,072,121 | 9,512,282,167 |
Notes:
With respect to timber revenues collected in Indonesia between 1974 and 1976, the negative values during these years suggest that higher-than-optimal revenues were captured, but only if no transfer pricing took place, which is unlikely.
With respect to Sabah, timber revenues collected between 1994 and 1996 have values of zero (0) because a log export ban was in place during the entire duration of those years. Actually, the log export ban actually went into effect in the beginning of 1993 and was phased out late in 1997. But because during these latter two years, a modest amount of logs were exported, and a small amount of timber revenue collected, it is still possible to derive estimates of revenue forgone per cubic meter.
Indonesia, Sarawak and Sabah failed to set timber revenues at optimal levels because their departments of forestry lacked autonomy, not so much from the rent-seeking demands of capital but more importantly from the rent-seeking demands of heads of state (the president of Indonesia, and the chief ministers of Sarawak and Sabah). This study has shown how forestry departments did not possess sufficient levels of autonomy from the predatory demands of heads of state, given that the departments awarded timber concessions to companies in which heads of state, their families or proxies serve as managers and shareholders.
Conclusion
Cutting down rain forests is a double tragedy. Not only are tremendous ecological and social values destroyed forever, but when governments lack the autonomy to capture timber rent from these forests, this can negatively impact the ability of states to prosper. If there is a lesson to impart it is that as little timber rent as possible should be diverted toward patronage ends or enriching rulers. If the rain forest is to be saved, or at least not disappear without anything to show for it, developing nations must create and faithfully implement incentives for the timber industry that encourage greater efficiency and sustainability, including the optimal capture of timber rent (Brown 1999: 72-80). However, this will not occur unless nations restrain their own political elites. Such restraints will not be erected by rulers, or even bureaucrats, who generally lack the autonomy to make such reforms. Rather strong institutional restraints on elites are unlikely to arise unless civil society demands it.
Appendix 1
Analysis of the total rent appropriated annually (in dollars) by a ten-percent shareholder in a timber concession
$20 | $40 | $60 | $80 | $100 | |
20,000 hectares | 100,000 | 200,000 | 300,000 | 400,000 | 500,000 |
40,000 hectares | 200,000 | 400,000 | 600,000 | 800,000 | 1,000,000 |
60,000 hectares | 300,000 | 600,000 | 900,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,500,000 |
80,000 hectares | 400,000 | 800,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,600,000 | 2,000,000 |
100,000 hectares | 500,000 | 1,000,000 | 1,500,000 | 2,000,000 | 2,500,000 |
120,000 hectares | 600,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,800,000 | 2,400,000 | 3,000,000 |
140,000 hectares | 700,000 | 1,400,000 | 2,100,000 | 2,800,000 | 3,500,000 |
Notes:
Top row - rent in dollars per cubic meter appropriated in a particular year
Left column - concession area in hectares
The above table assumes:
a ten percent share in a concession earns a ten percent share of the rent generated by that concession
1/20 of the timber concession is harvested each year
50 cubic meters of commercially valuable timber is removed from each hectare of the concession.
Following are instructions on how to use the table above. In the chapters on Indonesia, Sarawak and Sabah, the reader will come across the names and descriptions of individual shareholders in timber concessions of various sizes. To find out how much a given shareholder banked in a year, take the size of the timber concession in which she or he holds shares, round the size to the nearest multiple of 20,000 hectares, and match it to one of the sample concession sizes in the left column of Table 2.2. Then, using figures 3.6, 4.2, and 5.2, find out the average amount of timber rent not captured during a particular year (in dollars per cubic meter), round it to the nearest multiple of $20, and match it to one of the figures in the top row of the table. Draw two imaginary lines, one left to right from the figure for concession hectarage, and one down from the figure for uncaptured rent per cubic meter. Where the two lines meet will be the annual timber rent appropriated by that individual, during the year selected, assuming that she or he held a ten percent share. Usually, however, shareholdings are not exactly ten percent. If the individual's shareholding is only 2.5 percent, divide by four. If the individual's shareholding is 40 percent, multiply by four, and so on. Following are examples, one from each of the three cases in this dissertation, on how to use the table.
Taking an example from Sarawak, Table 4.4 tells us that Chief Minister Taib's bomoh (traditional healer and spiritual medium), a probable proxy, holds a 20 percent share in the 55,912 hectare Pelutan timber concession. Picking a year at random, let's take 1993, the same year we used in the Indonesia example, we turn now to Figure 4.2, which shows that in that year, the average timber rent per cubic meter not captured by the government of Sarawak was $160 a year. We now go to the table above and draw a line straight to the right from 60,000 hectares, which is the size of the Pelutan concession rounded to the nearest multiple of 20,000 hectares. There is no column for uncaptured rent of $160, so we follow the $100 column down until it meets the first line we drew. We will remember later to upwardly revise our final figure by a multiple of 1.6. The figure in the cell where the two lines meet is $1.5 million per year. Remembering to multiply this figure by 1.6, we get $2.4 million. This means that, assuming the Chief Minister's bomoh held a 10 percent share in the concession, he banked $2.4 million in timber rent in 1993. However, he held a 20 percent share in the concession. So we multiply by two, and arrive at the figure of $4.8 million in timber rent appropriated by him in that year.
Malaysia (General)
Organization Name | Informant's Name | Date(s) of Interview(s) |
Aliran | Ariffin Omar | 9 July 1994 |
Aliran | P. Ramakrishnan | 9 July 1994 |
Asian Wall Street Journal | Leslie Lopez | 15 August 1996; 21 March 1997; 16 July 1997 |
Asian Wall Street Journal | Raphael Pura | 26 June 1996; 18 August 1997 |
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Senior Analyst | Long Shih Rome | 3 April 1997 |
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson | Seow Choong Liang | 25 July 1997 |
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Corporate Finance, Director | Piers Willis | 26 November 1997; 23 January 1998 |
Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia (EPSM) | Gurmit Singh | 5 August 1994 |
Ethylene Malaysia (Etylnas), Operations Department | Aznan Zahid | 18 June 1996 |
Far Eastern Economic Review | S. Jayasankaran | 15 August 1996 |
Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers, Industry Groups Division, Analyst | Lawrence Koong | 6 March 1997 |
Institute for Strategic and International Studies | Rozali Mohamed Ali | 14 July 1994 |
Jardine Fleming | Razani Radzi | 8 August 1994 |
Malaysian Timber Industry Board (MTIB), Marketing Division | Mohd. Kheiruddin | 20 August 1996 |
Ministry of Primary Industries | Abdul Rahim Bin Hassan | 9 and 15 August 1996 |
Pernas | Ismail Halim | 15 August 1996 |
Petronas, Corporate Affairs | Abdul Rahman Ishak | 5 June 1996 |
Petronas Carigali | Sashi Kumar | 17 June 1996 |
Petronas Gas | Syed Mohd. Kamal Alhabshi | 18 June 1996 |
Petronas Gas | Ahmad Pathil | 18 June 1996 |
Petronas Gas | Ozair Saidin | 18 June 1996 |
Petronas Penapisan | Sazali Hamzah | 18 June 1996 |
Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School | Greg Felker | 13 July 1994 |
Shook, Lin and Bok | Param Cumaraswamy | 15 July 1994 |
University of California, Berkeley, Department of Sociology | Brian Folk | 20 May 1996 |
Universiti Malaya, Institute of Advanced Studies | Jomo K.S. | 19 July 1997 |
World Wide Fund for Nature Malaysia | Mikhail Kavanagh | 5 August 1994 |
World Wide Fund for Nature Malaysia | Sanar (Saneth) Kumaran | 4 March 1997 |
World Wide Fund for Nature Malaysia | Geoffrey Davison | 10 March 1997 |
Sarawak
Organization's Name | Informant's Name | Date(s) of Interview(s) |
Borneo Pulp and Paper Advisor | James Ng | 11 November 1996 |
Caspian Securities | Andrea Boult | 31 March 1997 |
Consumer Association of Penang | Mary Assunta | 23 August 1996 |
Democratic Action Party | Dominique Ng | 29 and 31 May 1997 |
Institut Pekerjaan Komuniti | Khoo Kay Jin | 28 October 1997 |
Jaya Tiasa Plywood Facility 2, Assistant Manager | Hii Yii Chiok | 29 October 1997 |
Jaya Tiasa, Head of Investor Relations | William Wong | 29 October 1997 |
Kapit, Wakil Kota | Joseph Jinggut | 7 June 1997 |
KTS Group, Chairman | Lau Hui Kang | 30 October 1996 |
Long Anap village | Jimmy Kebing Apoi | 22 July 1994 |
Long Anap village | John | 28 July 1994 |
Malaysia National Parliament | Chiew Chin Sing | 19 July 1997 |
Middlesex University, UK | James Chin | 12 August 1997 |
New Straits Times, Sarawak | James Ritchie | 4 November 1996 |
Reliable and well-informed academic | Anonymous | 25 October 1996, 23, 26 and 27 May 1997 |
Researcher | Anonymous | 15 November 1996 |
Rimbunan Hijau, head of Investor relations | William Wong | 29 October 1996 |
Sahabat Alam Malaysia | Farhan Ferrari | 10 July 1994 |
Sahabat Alam Malaysia | Thomas Jalong Apoi | 18, 27 and 28 July 1994 |
Sahabat Alam Malaysia | Muniandy Thayalan | 22 August 1996 |
Samling Corporation, group headquarters, Miri | Anonymous | 22 October 1996 |
Samling Corporation, Sarawak Plywood timber concession | Dominic | 28 July 1994 |
Samling Corporation, Sarawak Plywood timber concession | Willy | 22 July 1994 |
Sarawak Forest Department, Director of Forests | Cheong Ek Choon | 2 August 1994; 13 November 1996 |
Sarawak Forest Department, Consultant | Alfred Leslie | 9 November 1996 |
Sarawak Forest Department, Operations Division | Wong Siong Kuan | 28 May 1997 |
Sarawak Ministry of Environment, Minister of the Environment | James Wong | 12 November 1996 |
Sarawak Ministry of Finance, Former Assistant Minister | Patau Ubis | 11 June 1997 |
Sarawak Ministry of Industry, Minister of Industry | Abang Johari | 12 November 1996 |
Sarawak Ministry of Resource Planning, Environment and Development Section, Head | James Mamit | 1 August 1994 |
Sarawak Shell, Bintulu Operations Coordination Centre | Wilson Y.B. Wee | 25 October 1996 |
Sarawak Shell MDS | Jong Lee Fah | 24 October 1996 |
Sarawak Shell MDS | Francis Victor Klanang | 24 October 1996 |
Sarawak Timber Association | Barney Chan | 2 August 1994, 8 and 13 November 1996 |
Sarawak Timber Association | Annie Ting | 13 November 1996 |
Sarawak Timber Industrial Development Corporation, Harwood, Planning Division | Abdul Hadi | 27 May 1997 |
Sarawak Timber Industrial Development Corporation | Abang Naruddin | 2 August 1994 |
Sarawak journalist | Anonymous | 28 May 1997 |
Sarawak State Assembly | Aidan Wing | 4, 5, and 6 June 1997 |
Sarawak State Assembly | Billy Abit Joo | 1 November 1996 |
Sarawak State Assemblyman | Anonymous | 4 June 1997 |
Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation | Edmund Daging Mangku | 14 November 1996 |
University of California at Berkeley, Department of Political Science | Michael Goldman | 8 and 16 November 1996 |
Universiti Malaya, Faculty of Economics | John Phua | 26 October 1996 |
Well-placed and knowledgeable Source in Sarawak | Anonymous | 5 and 8 October 1996; 5, 7, 8, 11 and 14 November 1996; 30 March 1997; 26 and 27 May 1997 |